Non-Charter Municipalities: Local Self-Government by Duffey, John J.
NON-CHARTER MUNICIPALITIES:
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
JoHN J. DUFFEY*
In adopting article XVIII of the Constitution of Ohio the
people made a dramatic and drastic revision of municipal law. This
article deals with the main lines of development in general municipal
power of non-charter municipalities to enact non-regulatory laws
(sale of property, civil service, etc.). Specific powers, such as utilities
and taxation, are covered elsewhere in this symposium. This discussion
will concentrate on the judicial interpretation of section 2, 3 and 7
of article XVIII as they relate to non-charter municipalities.
The division of legal and political power between a central
government and its local units has been a vexatious problem plaguing
all ages and every society. The problem consists of obtaining a balance
between conflicting political interests and administrative methods.
Chief Justice Carl V. Weygandt has observed that Ohio's con-
stitutional provisions for the division of power "have been highly and
often bitterly controversial even from the time they were first pro-
posed." He went on to state:
Hence, it is not surprising, either, that with the changing personnel
of the court during the 44 years these provisions have been in
effect, it has been no easy task to maintain something even remotely
resembling consistency .... I
This latter statement and particularly its indubitable accuracy
should give any lawyer, or non-lawyer, considerable cause for
reflection. That any system for the division of governmental power
should be controversial is quite natural. But to find that after numer-
ous cases over 47 years there is little which even remotely resembles
consistency is a severe condemnation of either the constitutional
provisions, or the court's interpretation of those provisions, or both.
Pm-1912
American common law generally relegated municipalities to the
position of an arm or agency of state government-a creature of the
legislature. Accordingly, they possessed only delegated powers and
these were to be strictly construed. Judge Dillon's attempted
thumbnail definition of municipal power is the most oft-quoted
statement in municipal law:
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1 State ex rel. Lynch v. Cleveland, 164 Ohio St. 437, 132 N.E.2d 118 (1956).
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It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no
others: First, those granted in the express words; second, those
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly
granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the de-
clared objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply con-
venient but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt
concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against
the corporation and the power is denied.2
Whether Judge Dillon's statement is sufficiently accurate or com-
prehensive enough to be relied upon is not important here. It does
portray the position of Ohio common law.
3
The irresponsible and abusive use of power by state legislatures
under the common law concept has been forgotten today. But it
is well documented.4
The first major step in Ohio to curb the state legislature's
abuse was a prohibition against special laws in the constitution of
1851.1 However, by the use of the device of classification the state
legislature managed to wholly evade that restriction. Abuses again
grew. Finally, in 1902 the supreme court declared invalid the entire
classification structure of Ohio municipal law.6 The resulting crisis
led to the adoption of the Municipal Code of 1902 in a special
session of the legislature. This Code remains as the basic statutory
law of Ohio.
In the period from 1851 to 1912 the worst aspect of state
supremacy was not positive abuse of power but the irresponsible
failure to enact desperately needed reforms. Considering that problem
in broad outline, there are 3 major ways of attacking it by a con-
stitutional division of powers:
1. Simply reverse the common law concept, i. e., instead of
municipalities having only those powers granted by statute,
give municipalities very broad power to act by constitu-
tional grant but allow the legislature to limit or prohibit
municipal powers by statute.
2 Dillon, 1 Mun. Corp. § 237 (5th ed.).
3 See Benjamin v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957); State ex rel.
Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71, 102 N.E. 670 (1913).
4 Fordham, Local Government Law 12 (1949); Mallison, "General versus Special
Statutes in Ohio," 11 Ohio St. L.J. 462 (1950); Walker, "Municipal Government in
Ohio Before 1912," 9 Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1948).
G The principle Constitutional Provision is art. II, § 26. Other provisions also bear
on the requirement of "uniform" or "general" laws. See Mallison, supra note 4.
6 State ex rel Attorney-General v. Beacom, 66 Ohio St. 491, 64 N.E. 427 (1902);
State ex rel. Knisely v. Jones, 66 Ohio St. 453, 64 N.E. 424 (1902).
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An immediate subsidiary problem would be to decide what
legislative action is to be considered as limiting municipal power.
A liberal approach using statutory interpretation to draw broad
implications, creation of preemption concepts, etc., could easily
put the situation back very close to the legislative supremacy of
common law. A strict approach requiring specific positive statutory
provision would have great legal and political significance. Politically,
it is much easier to block restrictive legislation than it is to obtain
enactment of broadening legislation. This is especially true if, as in
Ohio, municipal representation in the legislature is substantial.
Legally, municipalities could obtain wide freedom from reliance on
statutory law. Municipal action would require only a proper public
purpose and lack of restrictive statutes.
The primary responsibility for determining the division and
scope of specific power would rest with the state legislature and
political processes. 7
2. Distribute governmental power by constitutional provision
between the legislature and the local units.
Two subsidiary problems immediately arise. Is the separation
to be absolute so that each has exclusive jurisdiction over its
fields and the other has no power to act; or is each to be supreme in
its field so that one can act where the other has not? How are the
respective fields of power to be defined-by specific enumeration
or by general guides, such as "municipal affairs," "local self govern-
ment" or "state-wide concern"?
This general approach would obviously have a drastic impact.
Within the sweep of their power, municipalities would have complete
protection from legislative indifference and abuse. On the other
hand, the state legislature would lack power to act and could not
gain any such power except by a change in the constitution. Further,
if the state is deprived of any ability to control municipal action,
some device is needed to allow the inhabitants of the municipality
to place limits on their own officials. One such device is to allow
7 A corollary of the common law concept of municipal power was the doctrine of
delegation of legislative power. As creatures of the state legislature having only such
powers as were granted by statute, municipal law also had to struggle with concepts of
limitations on the ability of the state legislature to delegate its powers. The device of
"statutory home-rule" is a constitutional enabling provision which permits the state
legislature to delegate broad law-making power to municipalities. This approach does
not, of course, solve the problem of getting the power to the municipalities. If statutes
are passed which- do grant broad powers, the end result can be very close to the effect
of a constitutional reversal of the common law concept. The system is used in many
States with varying degrees of success.
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the local adoption of municipal charters which would operate as a
local constitution.
Finally, there is the question of what municipalities are to
have these powers, i. e., are the constitutional grants to be self-
executing or to require local action. If self-executing, each municipal-
ity, whether charter or non-charter, small village or large city,
becomes a state legislature in miniature-within, of course, the
powers granted. Substantial arguments can be made that many
small municipalities are not prepared to assume complete responsi-
bility for guiding their own affairs-especially not prepared to
draft and adopt their own local constitution.
Defining the powers granted is a far more important problem
in a distribution approach than in the case of a mere reversal
of the common law concept. The respective interests and needs
of the state and municipality change with time and, inherently,
they overlap. Since the division is by constitutional provision any
mistake' is set in "concrete" and it would require a change in the
constitution to rectify it.' The "mistake" could be made originally
in the distribution of powers or it could become a mistake through
changes in the social conditions. Specific enumeration of powers
is obviously difficult-in fact, impossible in the sense that at some
point general categories would have to be made.'
Under this approach, the scope of municipal power is largely
a matter of constitutional interpretation. The primary responsi-
bility for determining the division and scope of municipal power
would rest upon the state courts. The broader the categories of
powers stated, the heavier the courts' responsibility becomes. The
serious question must then arise whether the courts are institutionally
capable of doing an adequate job of dividing legislative power
between the state and its municipalities.
3. The third approach is a combination of constitutional
municipal power with legislative supremacy, and of a
separation of powers. The variations possible are as in-
numerable as the breakdown of specific powers.
Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, as interpreted by the
Ohio courts, uses the compromise approach. For example, power
over municipal utilities is for the most part granted exclusively to
8 In the division of govenmental power, opinions will always vary on whether any
particular result is a "mistake."
9 As used here, "change" means either constitutional amendment or a re-interpreta-
tion, including overruling of earlier decisions.
10 Compare the American Municipal Association model constitutional provision
for home-rule.
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municipalities." On the other hand, taxing powers are granted to
municipalities but are specifically subject to legislative control.'"
The basic municipal power provisions are found in section 2,
3 and 7. The language used in these sections is general enough
(or confusing enough) to enable reasonable men to disagree vio-
lently on which of the two basic approaches was intended. Even
assuming a choice is made on which approach was intended, the
language is general enough (or confusing enough) to permit reasonable
disagreement on each of the important subsidiary questions. 3
"ALL POWERS OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT"
The key provision of article XVIII is section 3. To facilitate
analysis and discussion it can be broken into three parts:
(Clause 1) "Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all
powers of local self-government"
(Clause 2) "and to adopt and enforce within their limits such
local police, sanitary and other similar regulations,"
(Clause 3) "as are not in conflict with general laws."
The first major issue in interpreting section 3 is the question of
the application of the "conflict" clause. Does it modify only the grant
of police powers or does it qualify the entire grant, i.e., powers of
"local self-government" and "police" powers?
Almost immediately after the adoption of article XVIII the court
gave what appeared to be a firm answer to that question. In Fitzgerald
v. Cleveland 4 the specific question was the power of Cleveland to es-
tablish a mode of selecting candidates for municipal office that differed
from that prescribed by statute. Three judges specifically discussed
the interpretation of section 3 and concluded that the "conflict" clause
applied only to the police powers (clause 2) and did not modify the
grant of "all powers of local self government" (clause 1). The three
dissenting judges concurred in that interpretation of section 3 but
argued that the particular matter in question (mode of selecting
candidates) was controlled by a specific constitutional provision in
article V, section 7 of the constitution. 5
11 The interpretation of the municipal utility provisions of art. XVIII is dealt with
in another article in this issue.
12 Art. XVIII, § 13. The interpretation of § 13 is dealt with in another article
in this issue.
13 Not only does the literal wording of art. XVIII fail to differentiate the approach
intended, but the journal of the Constitutional Convention of 1912 does not provide
clear guidance. However, the Ohio Supreme Court has seldom bothered to refer to the
journal for help. For example State ex rel. Petit v. Wagner, 170 Ohio St. 297, 164
N.E.2d 574 (1960) interpreting §§ 2, 3 and 7.
14 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
15 Even though the powers of "local self-government" are not controlled by the
[Vol. 21
OHIO CONST. ART. XVIII
Dean Fordham has shown that there is reasonable grounds to
believe that the court's interpretation of section 3 is wrong.16 How-
ever, on that point, the court has in case after case re-asserted the
basic proposition that clause 1 is not limited by the conflict clause.17
A second foundation stone must be laid. Section 3 confers powers
on "municipalities." Do all municipalities possess these powers of
local self-government? First, nothing in article XVIII allows a group
of people to incorporate themselves. Under section 1, municipal
corporations are classified as cities and villages. Section 2 provides:
"General laws shall be passed for the incorporation and government
of cities and villages." Thus, a municipality is brought into being
under "general," i.e., statutory law. A municipality therefore starts
with the form of government prescribed by statute. Its structure of
organization and the allocation of powers between the offices is estab-
lished by statute. Next, section 2 permits the passage of "additional"
laws which become effective upon local acceptance by a vote. In
Revised Code Chapter 705, the General Assembly established three
additional forms of government which may be adopted by a vote
subsequent to incorporation. This is generally referred to as the "local
option law." Finally, section 7 provides:
Any municipality may frame and adopt or amend a charter for its
government and may, subject to the provisions of section 3 of this
article, exercise thereunder all powers of local-self government.
Under this provision any existing municipality clearly has the
power through charter adoption to provide its own individual form of
government. It can create such offices, and allocate municipal power
conflict clause, municipalities are subject to general constitutional safeguards, (due
process, etc.) and to other specific provisions, such as the art. XII ad valorum property
tax limitations. The problem in Fitzgerald thus became one of deciding if art. V, § 7
was a specific provision giving the state control of municipal candidate selections, or
whether municipalities could control the matter as a power of local self-government
under art. XVIII, § 3.
16 Fordham and Asher, "Home Rule Power," 9 Ohio St. L.J. 18 (1948).
17 The most recent re-affirmations are State ex rel. Petit v. Wagner, 170 Ohio St.
297, 132 N.E.2d 118 (1960); State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 151
N.E.2d 722 (1958); State ex rel. Lynch v. Cleveland, 164 Ohio St. 437, 132 N.E.2d 118
(1956). The practical significance of the resulting municipal supremacy depends on
what powers the court considers "local" and upon how broadly or narrowly it defines
"police" regulations. By its manipulations of those definitions, the court can make the
Fitzgerald doctrine of great significance, or render it almost meaningless. Compare for
example, State ex tel. Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E.2d 778 (1953) dealing
with slum clearance, and Hagerman v. Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947),
dealing with the meaning of "police" regulations. The Fitzgerald doctrine presents
another subsidiary question. What other provisions of the constitution limit these
clause 1 powers? This question is discussed infra.
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to those offices, as its people deem best.18 For example, and not as a
suggestion, all legislative power need not be vested in a council. Some
might be placed in another office or body, such as the control of parks,
etc. The number of executive offices could be narrowed or extended
from those provided by statute."9
The existence of section 7 and particularly the peculiar wording
of the last portion raises a question of whether section 3 is to be taken
literally or whether the powers granted by section 3 come into play
only if a charter is adopted. Are the powers of local self government
available to all municipalities or is charter adoption a prerequisite?
Again, a definitive answer appears to have been given almost
immediately. In State ex rel. Toledo v. Lynch20 the non-charter city
of Toledo appropriated money for a theater. Two questions were
argued to and discussed by the Court: could a non-charter city exer-
18 Three of the principle cases on the § 7 power to establish a form of government
are: State ex rel. Hackley v. Edmonds, 150 Ohio St. 203, 80 N.E.2d 769 (1948);
Frankenstein v. Hillenbrand, 100 Ohio St. 339, 126 N.E. 309 (1919); State ex rel. Fitz-
gerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
19 Occasionally the courts have lost sight of the operation of § 7 as empowering
a municipality to determine its own governmental structure and allocate the rights and
duties as it deems best. In State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d
501 (1944), the Charter provided that the city manager should hear cases relating to
the suspension of patrolmen. Gen. Code § 4367 (now Rev. Code § 737.01) states "there
shall be a department of public safety, which shall be administered by a director of
public safety." Gen. Code § 4380 (now Rev. Code § 737.12) put the hearing power in
the director. The court held the Charter provision void. It relied on a dual argument:
that the operation of a police department was a non-local matter, or one of "state-wide
concern"; and apparently that all matters touching a police department were a "police
regulation" and subject to the conflict clause of § 3. The decision and syllabus 4, 5 and
6 were over-ruled in State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722
(1958), in which the matter was held to be neither a matter of "state-wide concern"
nor a "police regulation."
The interesting point is that the allocation of power to the city manager would
seem clearly a matter of the form of "government" controlled by §§ 2 and 7. Yet the
Sherrill case never discussed that point, nor did Canada do so in over-ruling Sherrill.
The absurdity of the Sherrill oversight became apparent in Sullivan v. Civil
Service Commission, 102 Ohio App. 269, 131 N.E.2d 611 (1956). The Euclid Charter
did not provide for any safety director. The ludicrous result was a holding that no
patrolman could be disciplined because no one had the power to hear charges!
The proper analysis of both Sherrill and Sullivan would seem to be that regardless
of whether limitations on the grounds for discipline are "police regulations" or not, the
person who exercises the power is controlled by the structure of government. The
statutes apply to non-charter municipalities because of § 2 of art. XVIII. But the
statutes are superceded by a charter adopted under § 7.
This analysis was adopted in Harsney v. Allen, 160 Ohio St. 36, 113 N.E.2d 86
(1953), but the court in Sullivan was apparently unaware of it. Thus Sullivan was
wrong to start with, and in any event, is over-ruled by implication under Canada.
20 88 Ohio St. 71, 102 N.E. 670 (1913).
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cise the "powers of local self-government" and was a theater a proper
public purpose? Four judges specifically said no to both questions.
One judge vehemently said Toledo did have powers of local self-
government but that a theater was not a public purpose. One judge
with equal vehemence said Toledo had the power and that a theater
was a public purpose.
The majority of four presented the plausible argument that while
section 3 granted powers to "municipalities" yet council and the mayor
are not the municipality. Under this view, the people are the munici-
pality and a charter was the means or device for the people to dele-
gate their powers to the officials. Therefore, a charter was a prerequi-
site to the exercise of section 3.
The other two judges made at least as plausible an argument.
Under their view section 3 granted general municipal powers and
granted it to "municipalities." Section 7 gave the further right to
establish a form of government, i.e., the form of government was
established by statute under section 2 and by section 7 a municipality
could adopt its own form. It is significant to note that both judges
specifically pointed to the "subject to" clause of section 7 as a reason
why a charter was not necessary.
The position of the majority did not last. Ten years later the
court decided Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway.2' Perrysburg, a non-
charter municipality, adopted an ordinance prohibiting the pickup or
discharge of passengers by buses. Judge Wanamaker who had dis-
sented in Toledo v. Lynch picked up three other judges and the
majority flatly held that the non-charter village could validly adopt the
ordinance by virtue of section 3. The syllabus specifically overruled
Lynch on the proposition that a charter was a prerequisite to section 3
powers.
The syllabus and opinion by Wanamaker simply relies on "local
self-government." No mention is made of whether the power came
from section 3, clause 1 or clause 2 (police regulations). The signifi-
cance would lie in the operation of clause 3 (the conflict clause). If
the ordinance was a police regulation, its validity would also involve
the question of conflict. However, the plaintiff did not argue that
the ordinance conflicted with any statute-merely that the village
lacked power. Two of the four judges concurred specially reserving
the question of the effect of the State asserting "jurisdiction" over
streets. The regulation of private buses would seem obviously to be
a "police regulation.12 2 The concurring opinion seems quite clearly
21 103 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923).
22 The grant of power to adopt "local police" regulations is one of the powers of
"local self-government." The conflict clause is simply a specific constitutional limitation
1960]
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to be reserving the question of a possible "conflict" with state statutes.
Three judges dissented on the ground that the ordinance was not a
"local regulation." Under this view, as the dissent commented, it is
unnecessary to consider whether the municipality had power under
section 3.
On the very same day the court also decided Village of
Struthers v. Sokol, and Youngstown v. Sandela.2 3 While the report
does not so state, both Struthers and Youngstown were non-charter
municipalities.2 4 Each had a liquor ordinance which differed from the
state liquor laws. In a unanimous opinion the court upheld the power
to adopt the ordinances under section 3 and further held that the
ordinances did not conflict with state statutes.
It is thus apparent that at that time all seven members of the
court concurred that all municipalities, charter and non-charter,
possessed and could exercise the powers granted by section 3 and
that only local police and similar regulations were subject to the
conflict limitation.
From 1923 to 1953 the Perrysburg doctrine was reiterated time
and again without modification. Numerous cases upheld local police
regulations of both charter and non-charter municipalities where no
conflict existed with state statutes. There were also cases following
the Fitzgerald doctrine, and upholding the exercise of non-police
powers derived from clause 1 of section 3 even though a conflict with
state statutes existed. However, there a factual distinction must be
noted. In holding statutes void on the ground of a violation of clause
1 powers, the supreme court cases invariably involved charter munici-
palities. Of course, under Perrysburg the fact that a charter had been
adopted would be totally irrelevant. On the Perrysburg theory, munici-
pal power was derived from section 3, not the charter. The statements
of the supreme court clearly reflected an acceptance of non-charter
municipalities' powers.2"
Two lower-court cases involved non-charter municipalities. In
on that particular power just as § 13 is a specific limit on the "local self-government"
power to tax. See State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 NE.2d 722
(1958). Since no "conflict'! was claimed, the majority opinion simply upholds the
ordinance without specifying whether reliance was placed on clause 1 or clause 2 of
§ 3.
23 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
24 Struthers has never adopted a charter. Youngstown adopted a charter late in
1923, but it was not effective until January 1, 1924. The Perrysburg, Struthers and
Youngstown cases were all decided June 19, 1923.
25 See for example syllabus 1, 2 and 3 of State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio
St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944). It should be noted that these portions of the syllabus
were not over-ruled by Canada.
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Mansfield v. Endly2" the court upheld a non-charter city ordinance
establishing salaries of councilmen and declared a statute void. How-
ever, the supreme court affirmance was on a somewhat different
ground.
In Hugger v. Ironton28 the city sold land to the Federal Govern-
ment without advertisement for bids. The ordinance directly con-
flicted with General Code Section 3699 and Ironton was a non-charter
city. The appellate court held: first, that the sale of real estate is not
a police regulation and therefore not subject to the limitation of the
conflict clause of section 3; second, that it was a local matter and
therefore a power of local self-government; and third, that the statute
was void and that under clause 1 the city could "dispose of the real
property in question in the manner and by the procedure followed."
In considering Hugger, it should be noted that the court found
that Ironton had power to sell real estate and that in the absence of
a charter provision which adopted state law, Ironton could exercise
that power by passing an ordinance, i.e., taking legislative action. The
court specifically found that both the abstract power and the ability
to exercise it were granted by section 3.
In view of the pronouncements of the supreme court, the
Hugger decision was the only logically consistent result possible. A
non-police power of local self-government is, under Fitzgerald, not
subject to the conflict clause and, under Perrysburg, Ironton had that
power. Therefore, the statute was void as an unconstitutional limita-
tion on "local self-government."
In Babin v. Ashland,29 the supreme court specifically held the
sale of real estate to be a power of local self-government. Ashland
was a charter city. However, Judge Taft relied upon both the ap-
pellate court decision and the dismissal of the appeal in Hugger.30
26 38 Ohio App. 528, 176 N.E. 462; aff'd 124 Ohio St. 652, 181 N.E. 886 (1931).
27 The supreme court relied on Elyria v. Vandermark, 100 Ohio St. 365, 126 N.E.
314 (1919). That case held a statute void on the ground that it established a population
classification of municipalities which violated art. XVIII, § 1.
28 83 Ohio App. 21, appeal dismissed 148 Ohio St. 670 (1947).
29 160 Ohio St. 328, 116 N.E.2d 580 (1953).
30 160 Ohio St. at 337, 116 N.E.2d at 586. Judge Taft again relied upon and
"adopted" Hugger in State ex rel. Leach v. Redick, 168 Ohio St. 543, 157 N.E.2d 106
(1957).
The sale of real estate is a good example of professional and judicial confusion. A
considerable line of cases has held municipal action void for non-compliance with
statutory requirements. Miller v. Brooksville, 152 Ohio St. 217, 89 N.E.2d 85 (1949);
State ex rel. Manchester v. Shriver, 113 Ohio St. 171, 148 N.E. 697 (1923) ; Zielonka v.
Carrel, 103 Ohio St. 50, 132 N.E. 161 (1921); Heck v. Jones, 79 Ohio App. 549, 74
N.E.2d 644 (1946); Merves v. Lorain, 32 Ohio L. Abs. 417 (Ct. App. 1939). All of
these, and especially Miller appear to be cases where the attorneys were unaware of
art. XVIIr, and the court didn't raise it. The cause is probably lack of research and
19601
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The interpretation of section 3 as of 1954 seemed clear: (1) While
local police regulations were subject to statutory control under the
conflict clause, the non-police powers were superior to conflicting state
statutes unless state power was found in a specific constitutional provi-
sion; (2) Section 3 was self-executing and applied to all municipalities,
charter or non-charter; (3) Since municipal power was derived directly
from Section 3, the only significance of a charter in this respect was
a) the ability to establish a form of government, and b) the ability
to place limitations on section 3 powers by charter provision.3
However, the Perrysburg doctrine is also of great significance in
charter interpretation. Can a charter city exercise a power of local
self-government on a matter which the charter doesn't even cover?
If a charter were a prerequisite to the exercise of section 3 powers
as per Toledo v. Lynch, it might reasonably be contended that it
operates as a grant of power. It would then follow that if the charter
was silent the city could not act. But if power is derived from section
3, it logically follows that a charter is a limitation of power. It would
then follow that if a charter is silent on a matter which is within
section 3 the city can act. Section 3 gives the power, the charter does
not take it away, ergo, the city has power. To put it another way, as
to a matter on which the charter is silent, a charter city is logically in
the exact same position as a non-charter municipality.
Pursuing this line of thought the first case directly dealing with
it is that of State ex rel. Thomas v. Semple. 2 Cleveland wished to
pay dues to a municipal association. In a per curiam opinion, without
any syllabus, the court held the expenditure unlawful. There was
some talk of a lack of public purpose. However, the opinion stated:
Without considering the validity of such a provision, it must be
conceded that there is no express provision of the charter of the
city of Cleveland relative to the contribution from the treasury of
the city to a fund made up of contributions of various municipalities
for the purposes enumerated in the constitution of the 'Conference
of Ohio Municipalities,' and no general provision from which au-
thority may be inferred to expend the funds of the city to assist in
creating and maintaining an organization....
the confusing statutory law of Ohio which, for the most part, is drafted and enacted
with utter disdain for art. XVIII. These cases are over-ruled by implication under
Babin and Redick-at least as to charter municipalities. As to non-charter, see the
balance of this article.
31 There are other advantages to charter adoption which are not pertinent to this
discussion. For example, municipal power over "non-local" matters is derived from
state statutes, and a number of statutes distinguish between charter and non-charter
municipalities. Art. XII, § 2 allows charter municipalities to escape the 10 mill tax
limitation.
32 112 Ohio St. 559, 148 N.E. 342 (1952).
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The Semple case was decided after Perrysburg but in theory it
was totally irreconcilable. If section 3 is the source of power, what
difference did it make that the charter had no express or general
provision?33 But in 1951 the court cleared the whole matter up and
overruled Semple. In State ex rel. McClure v. Hagerman,4 Dayton,
a charter city, authorized the payment of dues to a municipal associa-
tion. Judge Middleton faced the public purpose and home rule ques-
tions head on. Having found a public purpose, he disposed of Semple
as follows:
We do not undertake to distinguish the Semple case. In the last
paragraph of the opinion in that case reference is made to the
absence of express provision in the charter of the city of Cleveland
relative to the contribution to the Conference of Ohio munici-
palities. Such absence of specific charter authority is not, in our
judgment, controlling. Assuming that the charter of Cleveland con-
tained no prohibition against the expenditure, the authority of the
city to make it would be derived from the Constitution, just as we
have said in the instant case that the authority of the Dayton com-
mission is derived from the Constitution, provided the expenditure
is one for a public purpose. So far as the decision in the Semple
case is inconsistent with the conclusions herein stated that decision
is hereby overruled.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE PERRYSBURG DocTRINE
As the above review shows, from 1923 to 1953 the supreme court
forged the Perrysburg doctrine link by link until it was a solid chain
of logically consistent theory. During the same period, however, the
court also developed devices to evade much of the impact of the
doctrine. That, however, is another story." But the doctrine itself
was constantly strengthened. Ignoring for the moment the narrowness
of its application, a brief appraisal of its legal consequences is needed.
The operation of section 3 under the Perrysburg doctrine makes
a large quantity of the municipal code invalid. It is operative only as
to (1) provisions on incorporation and form of government, (2)
"police" power provisions and (3) grants of power to act in areas
which are not matters of local self-government.36 Within section 3,
33 Semple-type thinking also appears in State ex rel. Fairmount Center Co. v.
Arnold, 138 Ohio St. 259 at 262, 34 N.E.2d 777 (1941).
34 155 Ohio St. 320, 98 N.E.2d 835 (1951).
35 The two principle devices were the concept of "state-wide concern," and an
extremely broad interpretation of the meaning of "police regulations." On "non-
local," see for example, Village of Beachwood v. Board, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d
921 (1958). On "police regulations," see State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St.
191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1948), and the discussion in 20 Ohio St. L.J. 152 (1959).
36 The municipal code is Rev. Code c. 7. Again, art. XVIII § 13 should be
considered. That section enables the General Assembly to control taxation and the
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clause 1, a municipality has the same breadth of power as the state
legislature previously had prior to 1912. Unless restricted by charter
provision, a municipality could exercise that power just as the state
legislature did, i.e., merely by proper enactment of a law. As to non-
charter municipalities, the local legislative body is entrusted with vast
power-freed almost entirely of many safeguard provisions imposed
on local government by statute, i.e., requirements of notice, hearing,
bidding, etc. The significance of this is apparent. While much of the
state municipal code is open to heavy criticism, most of it also provides
desirable safeguards for the public interest. Yet, the vast bulk of
municipalities are non-charter. 7 Few small municipalities have ade-
quate legal advice and are prone to follow the statutes.
Of course, there are several answers to this thesis. The municipal
officials' power would be very broad but no broader than that of the
General Assembly. They, too, are elected and responsible to their
electorate. The electorate also has available the ability to impose
stringent restrictions if they wish. The procedure for doing so is
created in the constitution, is very simple, and requires only a majority
of those voting. 8
MORRIS v. ROSEMAN 39
The first direct inroad upon section 3's interpretation came in the
Morris case. Rev. Code section 713.12 requires a public hearing and
30-days' notice before the enactment of a zoning ordinance. Oakwood,
a non-charter village, adopted a zoning ordinance as an emergency
measure and without notice or hearing. The village did, of course,
comply with the general requirements of the incorporation statutes
for legislative action, i.e., proper meeting, quorum, etc. In a 5 to 1
decision the court held the ordinance void. The syllabus reads:
1. Section 3, Article XVHI of the Constitution of Ohio, con-
ferring 'home rule' power, does not in and of itself empower an
Ohio noncharter municipality to enact an emergency zoning ordi-
nance effective immediately; and such noncharter municipality, in
the enactment of a zoning ordinance, must comply with the provi-
sions of Section 4366-11, General Code (Section 713.12, Revised
Code), which requires the holding of a public hearing on such
incurring of "debt." It should be noted that the statutes impose extensive fiscal
controls the validity of which is somewhat dubious. The "Uniform Tax Levy Law"
(Rev. Code c. 5705) rigidly controls the procedure and purposes of tax levies. The
purpose limitations are probably all invalid. However, the area of fiscal controls has
been little litigated. The court's generally pro-General Assembly attitude in municipal
fiscal affairs makes a prediction of other possible distinctions very difficult.
37 As of June, 1960, Ohio had 776 villages and 150 cities. Only 90 municipalities
had "home-rule" charters under § 7 of art. XVIII.
38 art. XVIII, §§ 8 and 9.
39 162 Ohio St. 447 (1954).
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ordinance preceded by a 30-day notice of the time and place of
such hearing.
2. An Ohio municipality which has not adopted a charter for
its government, as authorized by Section 7, Article XVIII of the
Constitution of Ohio, must, in the passage of its legislation, follow
the procedure prescribed by the statutes enacted pursuant to the
mandate of Section 2, Article XVIII of the Constitution .... 40
In the terse opinion, Judge Zimmerman first reaffirmed Perrys-
burg. Then he recognized that zoning was a section 3 power. Then
the opinion states:
But how and in what manner is such power to be exercised?
The Constitution of Ohio provides two ways. By Section 2, Article
XVIII, a mandatory duty is placed upon the General Assembly to
enact laws for the incorporation and government of cities and
villages, and Section 7, Article XVIII, grants a municipality the
option of determining its own plan of local self-government by
framing and adopting a charter. If a municipality adopts a charter,
it thereby and thereunder has the power to enact and enforce ordi-
nances relating to local affairs, but, if it does not, its organization
and operation are regulated by the statutory provisions covering
the subject.
In other words, by Sections 3 and 7 of Article XVIII of the Con-
stitution, a municipality has the power to govern itself locally in
certain respects. The statutes in no way inhibit such power but
merely prescribe an orderly method for the exercise of such power
where the municipality has not adopted a charter and set up its
own governmental machinery thereunder .... 41
Judge Zimmerman said at the start of his opinion that "we now
revert to the question of whether a non-charter municipality possesses
the power to effectively adopt an emergency zoning ordinance." He
might have said that we now revert to the question of Lynch and
Perrysburg.
The Attorney-General was so firmly committed to a pure Perrys-
burg doctrine4 2 that he simply dismissed Morris as a peculiar applica-
tion of police regulation-conflict doctrines. 43
However, the court in both the syllabus and opinion relied on
section 2. Further, there is no mention of the section 3 conflict clause.
While zoning itself is clearly a police regulation nobody was contesting
40 Emphasis added.
41 Emphasis added.
42 See for example 1950 OA.G. No. 1478; 1946 O.A.G. No. 1371; 1945 OA.G. No.
272; 1942 OA.G. No. 5558.
43 1957 OA.G. No. 787. Prior to 1958, the Court had stretched and re-stretched
the meaning of "police regulations" to such an extent that this was not an unreasonable
interpretation of Mon-is. See Note in 20 Ohio St. L.J. 152 (1959).
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the content of the ordinance. The question was specifically on the
procedure used in adoption. Finally, it is difficult to see how enact-
ment procedure can possibly be classified as a "police regulation"-
whether the end product be a police or a non-police ordinance.
Viewed as an original question (say in 1913) the Morris decision
is certainly a reasonable interpretation of sections 2, 3, and 7. The
word "government" in section 2 is quite capable of greater meaning
than mere organizational form or structure as assigned to it by Perrys-
burg. In fact, Dean Fordham uses sections 2 and 7 to make a very
persuasive argument that Perrysburg was all wrong and a charter
should be required before home-rule powers can be exercised.44 But
Morris only goes halfway down that road-separating the abstract
substantive power from the "method" or "manner" or "procedure" of
exercising it.
However, the interpretation of section 2 was not an original
question for the court. True, Perrysburg didn't discuss the interpreta-
tion of "government" in section 2 as such. But it did specifically
discuss the word "government" in section 7 and Judge Zimmerman in
Morris linked these two sections, assigning the same meaning to the
word in both sections. Perrysburg did specifically overrule Toledo v.
Lynch. Lynch did exhaustively discuss sections 2 and 7 in the majority
opinion, the concurring opinion, and the dissenting opinion. It would
hardly seem reasonable to distinguish Perrysburg and the entire line
of cases developing that doctrine on the ground that they didn't con-
sider section 2. Nor did the court in Morris attempt to distinguish
earlier cases. The syllabus and the opinion merely state that a non-
charter municipality must "follow the procedure prescribed by statutes
enacted pursuant to the mandate of section 2." The court referred to
only one case as possible authority for its decision-State ex rel.
Fairmont Center Co. v. Arnold.4 5 In Arnold, the charter city of
Shaker Heights adopted a stop-gap zoning ordinance prohibiting
building permits for construction which would violate any pending
zoning change. The ordinance was adopted without the notice or
hearing required by then General Code sections 43 66-7 to 4366-11.
However, General Code sections 4366-12 specifically exempted charter
cities from the operation of the statutes and the court had so held.46
Thus, it was obvious that if the charter established a procedure and
council followed the charter, its action would be valid under any
analysis. However, the court held that the charter adopted state law
and that the council was acting under the statutes when it passed the
44 Fordham and Asher, "Home-Rule Power," 9 Ohio St. L.J. at 20-24 (1948).
45 138 Ohio St. 259, 34 N.E.2d 777 (1941).
46 Bauman v. State ex rel. Underwood, 122 Ohio St. 269, 171 N.E. 336 (1930).
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ordinances. 47 Having failed to comply with the statutory procedure,
the ordinance was void.
In Arnold, the statutes applied because of the charter incorpora-
tion of state law. The efficacy of the statute as law was derived from
the charter and article XVIII, not from any power of the General
Assembly. As as authority on the applicability of statutes to munici-
palities, Arnold is almost the exact opposite of the principle of
Morris!45
Even though Morris made no attempt to explain how its conclu-
sion was reached, the implication of the decision seemed clear. Since
Perrysburg was specifically re-affirmed; since both the opinion and
syllabus of Morris are specifically confined to the "procedure" or
"method" of enacting legislation; and since it held that the "statutes
in no way inhibit" home-rule powers granted by section 3; then a
non-charter municipality must still derive its substantive powers
directly from section 3. A statute, which was based on the general
powers of the state, and which interfered with home-rule power would
still be void. Only the procedure for exercising the substantive power
would be controlled by statute, i.e., the procedure for the enactment
of an ordinance.
Of course, that leaves the nasty question of what is "procedure"
and what is "substantive." Apparently, the hearing and 30-day notice
required by Rev. Code § 713.12 are to be considered procedure. In
the sale of real estate, Rev. Code § 721.03 requires a two-thirds vote
of council. Is that "procedure" or is that a void attempt to interfere
with local self-government by a partial restriction on the power to sell
land? The statute also requires advertisement, bids, and the sale to
the highest bidder. Is that "procedure"? Would the court consider a
statute "procedural' if it required private individuals to sell their
homes at auction to the highest bidder? 49
Obviously, in this field of law the "procedure-substantive"
47 The court's interpretation of the Charter as adopting state statutes is very
dubious. Many charters give council the option of following state statutes if they wish.
The fact that they failed to do so would seem immaterial if the procedure followed does
not violate a charter provision. The Shaker Heights Charter appears to have been of
this type.
48 The Arnold case also found the ordinance to be an unconstitutionally retroactive
law. The "home-rule" discussion would thus appear to be dictum in any event.
49 It is interesting to speculate on what would happen to the Hugger case under a
Morris analysis. Each of the requirements for the sale of land found in Rev. Code
§ 721.03 can reasonably be classified as "substantive." If so, Hugger and the Attorney-
General's opinion are both still correct in their result, but for a different reason.
A probable example of a non-procedural statute under Morris is Rev. Code § 717.01.
It limits municipal power to condemn utility property by requiring the relocation or
duplication of utility facilities.
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distinction totally lacks mental content. It can be defined only by
reference to specific matters. The Morris case validated a great deal
of the municipal code, but only extensive litigation could determine
which parts of it. If the court was unhappy with the Perrysburg doc-
trine's development, it would seem better to have adopted Dean
Fordham's analysis completely and simply overruled it-better, that
is, for the court's work load, and better for attorneys who must advise
on the law.
The problem of Lynch, Perrysburg, and Morris is an essentially
political one-should safeguards against abuse of power by local offi-
cials be a responsibility of the municipalities' electorate or the Gen-
eral Assembly? The decision in Morris appears to leave the court
without a clear answer to that problem and creates a new one where
its only yardstick is "procedural v. substantive." That distinction is
an even more elusive one than the distinction between "proprietory"
and "governmental" activities in the fields of municipal tort and tax
liability.
MORRIS AND CHARTER MUNICIPALITIES
As noted previously, the Perrysburg Doctrine was carried forward
in McClure to the logical conclusion that a charter is not a source of
home-rule power, but a limitation. Thus, if a charter is silent, McClure
held the city derived power to act from section 3. The Morris case
suggests a qualification on that concept.
Under Morris the procedure for enacting an ordinance is a matter
of "government" under section 2 and not a matter of "local self-
government" under section 3. Therefore, a charter municipality's
power to establish its own enactment procedure would logically be
derived from section 7-the power to adopt "a charter for its govern-
ment." The opinion in Morris appears to so state, although on its
facts that is clearly not a holding. On this approach, the charter does
act as a grant with respect to enactment procedure, and as a limitation
with respect to section 3 "substantive" powers.
This analysis raises points that anyone drafting or interpreting a
charter must consider. If enactment procedure is controlled by sec-
tions 2 and 7, it logically follows that if a charter is silent (or perhaps
not sufficiently specific) on procedure, section 2 applies and the city
must follow state law. Thus it would appear that every charter should
contain a boiler-plate on procedure. The simplest would be to provide
that unless otherwise prescribed in the charter the only procedure
necessary is the regular passage of an ordinance. In light of the
Arnold case, provisions "allowing" council to follow state law are
highly dangerous.50
50 See note 47, supra.
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STATE EX REL. PETIT V. WAGNER 51
An even deeper inroad on the Perrysburg doctrine may have been
made in the recent Petit case.
The position of municipal civil service regulations had for a con-
siderable period of time been in a state of confusion. One series of
cases, starting at a very early date, held civil service to be a matter of
local self-government within section 3.12 However, as to policemen
and firemen another later series of cases classified administrative
regulations either as "police" regulations controlled by the conflict
clause of section 3 or as a matter of "statewide concern," apparently
not even within the home-rule amendment. 3 In the 1950's another
series of cases began to make inroads on the police and firemen cases. 4
These cases culminated in State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips.5 In Canada
the court overruled or distinguished the 1940 cases and returned to the
earlier position that civil service, including that for policemen and fire-
men, was a home-rule matter.56
All four of the cases decided in the 1950's involved charter cities.
The first two, Lapolla and Harsney, deal with the power of the Chief
of Police. In Lapolla, the court's reasoning can be summarized as
follows: The Youngstown charter placed sole direction of the police
department in the mayor; therefore, in Youngstown, the Chief of
Police did not hold a public office, but rather was an employee; that
51 170 Ohio St. 297, 164 N.E.2d 574 (1960).
52 See Hile v. Cleveland, 118 Ohio St. 99, 160 N.E. 621 (1928); State ex rel. Vogt
v. Donahey, 103 Ohio St. 440, 140 N.E. 609 (1923); State ex rel. Lentz v. Edwards,
90 Ohio St. 305, 107 N.E. 768 (1914).
53 See State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944);
Daly v. Toledo, 142 Ohio St. 123, 50 N.E.2d 338 (1944); Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138
Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941); In re Fortune, 138 Ohio St. 385, 34 N.E.2d 442
(1941); State ex rel. O'Driscoll v. Cull, 138 Ohio St. 516, 37 N.E.2d 49 (1941); State
ex rel. Strain v. Houston, 138 Ohio St. 203, 34 N.E.2d 219 (1941).
54 See State ex rel. Lynch v. Cleveland, 164 Ohio St. 437, 132 N.E.2d 118 (1956);
Harsney v. Allen, 160 Ohio St. 36, 113 N.E.2d 86 (1953); Lapolla v. Davis, 55 Ohio
L. Abs. 490, 89 N.E.2d 706, motioan to certify denied, 151 Ohio St. 550, 86 N.E.2d 615
(1949). The 1940 series did not distinguish, overrule nor cite the earlier cases. The
1950 series did not distinguish, overrule nor, for the most part, cite the 1940 series.
55 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958).
56 The court also disposed of art. XV, § 10. That provision deals with civil service
of the state, counties and cities. It does not use the word "villages." The last portion
provides that "laws shall be passed providing for the enforcement of this section."
Canada held that by this provision the General Assembly obtains power to enact civil
service laws for cities, but that a city's power over civil service comes from art. XVIII
and would control. Thus, in effect, the two have concurrent jurisdiction over civil
service, with supremacy in the cities. But General Assembly power over civil service
of villages can not be based on art. XV, § 10. Logically therefore, any state civil service
statutes for a charter village are simply void. As to non-charter municipalities, city or
village, an analysis has to start with the Perrysburg doctrine.
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as an employee, his civil service status was to be determined under
the charter. This strongly suggests, and the opinion shows, that the
court relied in part on section 7 and the power to establish a structure
of "government," creating what offices it wished and distributing or
allocating power to those offices as it wished. Similarly in Harsney,
the Youngstown charter placed the power to station and transfer
patrolmen in the "Chief of Police." The statute placed the ultimate
power in the "director of public safety." The charter did not provide
for any such office. The court upheld: (1) the Chief's power to trans-
fer a patrolman and (2) the transfer as made. The first point again
seems clearly a section 7 power of a charter city to establish offices and
distribute power. The second is a civil service matter and based on
section 3. Again in Harsney, the court cited and relied upon both
sections.
In Lynch, the supreme court was concerned with the qualifications
and mode of selection for the Cleveland Police Chief. The qualifica-
tion and mode of selecting a person for municipal office would seem
reasonably classified as an integral part of establishing the structure
of government, and therefore controlled by section 2 for non-charter
cities and section 7 for charter municipalities. Thus if the Cleveland
Chief held an office under the charter, it would seem that the proper
analysis would be to uphold the city law under section 7. If the Chief
was an employee, then it was a civil service problem controlled by
article XV, section 10 and article XVIII, section 3. Interestingly
enough, the syllabus of Lynch v. Cleveland cites only section 3, al-
though the opinion cites and relies on section 7, too.
Canada dealt with the selection of a deputy inspector of police
in Columbus. The syllabus and opinion cite and rely on sections 3
and 7-one might almost say that they carefully cite both sections of
the constitution.
Between the Cleveland and Columbus cases, the court decided
State ex rel. Bindas v. Andrish.57 The court upheld the power of a
charter city to establish qualifications for councilmen which differed
from statutory requirements. Again both sections 3 and 7 were used.
Obviously in the case of charter municipalities it was unnecessary
for the court to distinguish between reliance on section 3 and section 7.
Either way the charter municipality will win. But under Perrysburg,
the distinction would be vital. If these four cases were based on
section 3 "local self-government," non-charter municipalities ap-
parently would also be able to escape state statutes. But if, and to
the extent that these cases are based on section 7, only a charter
municipality would have power-and would have to exercise it by
57 165 Ohio St. 441, 136 N.E.2d 43 (1956).
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charter provision. Thus a sections 2 and 7 analysis provides a ready
tool to slice away some more of the impact of the Perrysburg doctrine,
and Morris had certainly lighted the path.
Inevitably a non-charter municipality changed the qualification
for its Chief of Police, and the precise question of its power arose in
State ex rel. Petit v. Wagner.
8
Under Rev. Code section 143.34, as interpreted by the court, the
position of chief of police had to be filled by a promotion within the
department. North College Hill, a non-charter city, passed an ordi-
nance allowing selection of an "outsider." In an unanimous opinion
the court held the ordinance void. The syllabus is rather innocuous
and does not reveal anything of the basis for the result. It merely
states:
A noncharter municipality is without authority under the provi-
sions of Section 3, Article XVIII, Constitution, to prescribe by
ordinance a method for the selection of a chief of police which is
at variance with the provisions of Secton 143.34, Revised Code.
The opinion utilizes a section 2 and 7 analysis to justify the result,
but with a most unexpected twist! Judge Peck starts by stating that
the city claimed a right under home-rule to adopt regulations on
police personnel which are at "variance" with statutory law. The
opinion then reaffirms that section 3 applies "with equal force" to
all municipalities. At this point the opinion states:
The case of Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, a Taxpayer, 108
Ohio St., 245, 140 N. E., 595, establishes the right of a munici-
pality to exercise certain powers of home rule in the absence of a
charter, but there the powers of home rule sought to be exercised
were not at variance with the general law. However, although it is
always of limited persuasion to seek guidance in a case which has
decided part of the whole, the circumstances of the Perrysburg
decision particularly cast doubt on the validity of arguing it as
authority for an extension of its own doctrine. In that case, three
of the judges of this court dissented, and two of the four judges
concurring in the majority opinion joined in a concurring opinion
specifically reserving "for future determination" the situation in
which the municipal enactment and the general law might be at
variance. Thus, far from being authority for the proposition that
a non-charter municipality can adopt regulations at variance with
general law, it is actually a case in which five of the seven members
of the court either adopted a diametrically opposite position or
explicitly emphasized the fact that they were not passing upon it.
This limitation of the Perrysburg decision is pointed up in City of
Cleveland v. Public Utilities Commission, 130 Ohio St., 503, 200
N.E. 765.r 9
58 170 Ohio St. 297, 164 N.E.2d 574 (1960).
59 170 Ohio St. at 300, 164 N.E.2d 576. Emphasis by the court.
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This is obviously a direct attack on Perrysburg and not an "end
run" as in Morris. It is true, of course, that there was no conflict or((variance" in Perrysburg. But, on the point of conflict with state
law, North College Hill would seem rather clearly to be relying on the
Fitzgerald doctrine, i.e., that clause 1 powers are not subject to the
"conflict" clause of section 3. It is also true that three judges dissented
in Perrysburg. But the dissent was on the ground that the Perrysburg
bus regulation was not the matter of local self-government. The
dissent in no way can be construed as rejecting the majority interpreta-
tion of section 3, nor of rejecting the application of the Fitzgerald
doctrine to non-charter municipalities. The dissenting opinion specifi-
cally stated that the powers of a non-charter municipality are
irrelevant under its view of the case. It is also true that the concur-
ring opinion of Perrysburg reserved for future determination the ques-
tion of a "variance." As previously noted, the Perrysburg ordinance
seems quite obviously to be a police regulation subject to the conflict
clause. All seven of the judges in Perrysburg joined in the Struthers
and Youngstown cases involving police regulations of non-charter
municipalities.
Judge Peck is swinging rather far afield in describing the dissent
in Perrysburg as adopting "a diametrically opposite position" and in
describing the concurring opinion as "not passing on it"-at least if
by "it" is meant the interpretation of section 3. Nor is the court's
citation of the Public Utilities Commission case of any help. That
case involved a P.U.C. order concerning a bus terminus on a line
traversing four municipalities. The court upheld the order against
the protest of a charter city. The opinion did not discuss Perrys-
burg except to note that a statute was passed after Perrysburg giving
the P.U.C. jurisdiction of transportation lines. Finally, the regulation
of bus lines and terminals would seem clearly a police regulation
subject to state control under section 3.
The Petit opinion then continues by reaffirming that the conflict
clause of section 3 limits only local police regulations. It then states:
Indeed, any other interpretation of Section 3 would render the
adoption of Section 7 senseless, because its grant of authority for
municipal charter operation is specifically 'subject to the provisions
of Section 3.' If full home-rule authority were intended to have
been created by Section 3, the adoption of Section 7 could only be
considered as a vain and superfluous act. Such a conclusion would
be completely lacking in justification, and was expressly denied in
the Canada case, supra.
The principle point under consideration in this quotation was the
interpretation of the conflict clause in section 3, i.e., a re-affirmance of
the Fitzgerald doctrine. The statements on the legal effect of section
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7 and the suggestion that section 3 does not grant "full" home-rule
power are something else.
As previously noted, the Perrysburg doctrine was originally open
to serious doubt. However, the claim that an interpretation of section
3 as a grant of "full" power to all municipalities is to make section 7
"a vain and superfluous act" is a rather shallow statement. It is hardly
"vain or superfluous" to grant power to establish a form of govern-
ment and provide restrictions on the exercise of home-rule powers.
The wording in the quotation suggests not only that section 3 did
not create "full" home-rule power, but that Canada expressly denied
such an interpretation. The Canada case re-affirmed Fitzgerald. With
respect to non-charter municipalities, Canada is relevant only by
implying either (1) that by virtue of the Perrysburg doctrine they
can establish qualifications for inspectors of police, and therefore the
opposite of the result in Petit; or (2) that the qualifications are to be
classified as a part of structure of "government" controlled by sections
2 and 7 and therefore consistent with the result in Petit. But by no
stretch can Canada be cited as authority that section 3, clause 1, did
not grant "full" power of local self-government.
The opinion next dismisses earlier Perrysburg authority with the
observation that all the cases concerned charter municipalities "and
thus presented a different problem." No mention is made of Mans-
field, Hugger, McClure or the many Attorney-General opinions.
Judge Peck's problem is thus reduced to explaining how it is
that a non-charter municipality which has enacted a non-police regula-
tion, can have power to exercise the other powers of "local self-govern-
ment" which admittedly are not controlled by the conflict clause, and
yet be subject to a state statute. The obvious answer would be to
classify the matter as part of the structure of government or as a
"procedural" requirement under Morris. However, the opinion creates
an entirely new theory which is far broader than those. The opinion
states:
Section 3 confers upon all municipalities 'authority to exercise all
powers of local self-government' but, as pointed out in Morris v.
Roseman, supra, does not state 'how and in which manner' such
powers are to be exercised. Section 2 specifically authorizes 'gen-
eral laws ... to provide for the ... government of' municipalities.
It is apparent therefore that, by what they said, the people
expressed an intention that, in the absence of the adoption of a
charter pursuant to Section 7 or of the adoption of any 'additional
laws ... for the government of municipalities adopting the same'
pursuant to Section 2, the 'general laws ... for the... government
of' municipalities authorized by Section 2 were to control a munici-
pality in the exercise of the powers of local self-government con-
ferred upon it by Section 3. Where a charter is adopted, then,
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under Section 7, the municipality 'may, subject to the provisions
[i.e., limitations] of Section 3 [not Section 2 and 3] . . .exercise
thereunder [i.e., under the charter instead of under general laws]
all powers of local self-government.' The only limiting provision
then applicable is that specified in Section 3, that 'local police,
sanitary and other similar regulations' shall 'not .. .conflict with
general laws.' (Paragraph four of syllabus of State, ex rel. Canada,
v. Phillips, supra.)
If this opinion is the law we have now come 359 and 2 degrees
around to 1913 and State ex rel. Lynch v. Toledo-a charter is a pre-
requisite. The cruelest cut to "home-rule enthusiasts" is the next
portion of the opinion:
This court has thus clearly recognized the distinction between the
powers of charter and non-charter municipalities. Clear evidence of
the intention that such a distinction should exist is found in the
very fact that the two provisions of the Constitution hereinabove
cited were adopted as separate sections; if an identical extent of
authority had been intended to have been conferred, a single section
would have abundantly sufficed. By these two sections, the Con-
stitution confers upon charter cities and villages some greater
degree of power not here required to be defined but limits the
general area of non-charter municipal authority. There is in the
present case a direct variance between the statute permitting only
members of a police department to take an examination of the type
here under consideration and the ordinance which contains no such
limitation, and it is our conclusion that such variance renders the
ordinance invalid. Differently stated, a non-charter municipality
is without authority under the provisions of Section 3, Article
XVIII of the Constitution, to prescribe less restrictive qualifications
for civil-service-examination applicants than are prescribed by
statute, since such municipal action would be at variance with the
general law.60
Obviously, the Petit analysis of Morris is a twisting of both the
syllabus and opinion of that case. In fact, it is a paraphrase of the
argument in the 1913 Lynch case rather than anything resembling the
"procedure" analysis of Morris.
There is yet that 2 degree to go. Petit seems to recognize clearly
the power of non-charter municipalities to exercise "all powers of local
self-government" where they don't conflict with statutory law. Perhaps
it would be better to use the word "variance" created by the court
and thereby avoid confusion with the concept of "conflict" in police
regulations. However, since the municipal code of 1902 is still essen-
tially on the books and since the General Assembly has for 47 years
continued enacting extensive amendments using the same drafting
technique, this new "variance" concept will provide little comfort to
the "home rule enthusiasts."
60 Emphasis added.
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The fate of the McClure doctrine seems somewhat up in the air.
Whether a charter is a limitation or a grant is a question of consider-
able importance in charter drafting and in charter interpretation.
Under the "variance" concept of Petit, charter municipalities "have
some greater degree of power" over matters of local self-government
that non-charter municipalities do not have. This greater power stems
from section 7 and apparently, therefore, from the charter.
The "variance" concept cannot be justified on either stare decicis
nor on a logical extension of an existing body of legal theory. It is
simply inconsistent with a synthesis of earlier case law. If accepted
as a part of home-rule law, it will have serious retroactive implica-
tions. The Perrysburg doctrine has been used as the basis for advising
non-charter municipalities. In the particular area of Petit, qualifica-
tion for municipal employment and civil service, the de facto doctrines
will mitigate its effect. But in other areas, particularly property law,
the implications are difficult to assess. As Hugger and the Opinions of
the Attorney-General show, there are apparently numerous instances
of non-charter municipalities disposing of real estate without complying
with the statutes. The "variance" concept would certainly seem to
create a cloud on title,"' opening these transfers to taxpayer's suits.
Of course, a "procedure" and structure analysis of sections 2 and
7 is still available to the Court as a means of limiting Petit and restor-
ing a portion of vitality to the Perrysburg doctrine. In view of the
judicial history of section 3, it is not impossible to believe that the
reasoning of Petit might be rejected and the result retained. Here the
Ohio syllabus rule might be very handy. If the case is considered on
its facts alone, then much of the reasoning becomes unnecessary. 2
Certainly that seems the logical strategy of argument for a municipal
attorney. However, attempts at "end runs" in home-rule have some-
times been very unsuccessful. The strategy backfired badly in the
tax field. Perhaps home-rule enthusiasts, therefore, should attack the
Petit reasoning head-on.
JURISPRUDENCE
In appraising the development of article XVIII, section 3, it
would be equally profitable to explore several other areas. The Fitz-
61 The Supreme Court of Ohio apparently will not use the device of "prospective
overruling." It failed to use it in an almost ideal situation. Rush v. Maple Heights, 167
Ohio St. 221, 147 N.E.2d 599 (1958). See Note, 19 Ohio St. L.J. 477 (1958).
62 One delicate problem is to gauge the effect of Petit upon the interpretation of
the municipal utility sections of art. XVIII. The court has followed a "Fitzgerald-
Perrysburg" type of reasoning in that field. However, §§ 4, 5 and 6 each start with
the words "Any municipality.. . ." This provides a ready means of distinguishing them
from § 3.
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gerald doctrine has received a pretty severe buffeting over the years. 3
The interpretation of the scope of "police" regulations had very nearly
reached a point of utter confusion until rescued by the Canada case."4
And in defining and applying the concept of "conflict" with state law,
it may be doubted that we have ever reached anything "remotely
resembling consistency.) 65
63 One device for limiting the impact of the Fitzgerald doctrine is the concept of
"state-wide concern." A clear example of its use can be found in Cincinnati v. Gamble,
138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941). Obviously the basic legislative power is vested
in the General Assembly by art. II, § 1. Likewise it would seem apparent that not all
governmental matters which may arise within the territorial limits of a municipality
can be classified as "local self-government." For example, the condemnation of land
and erection of a building for a state or county agency; the location of a state highway;
the establishment and operations of a health district by the State, etc. See Lakewood
v. Thormeyer, 171 Ohio St. 135 (1960). A convenient, if dangerous, way of distinguish-
ing these matters from "local" ones is to refer to them as being of "state-wide concern."
Logically, any such matter is entirely outside the operation of art. XVIII, and the
municipality's power to act, if at all, must be derived from a statutory grant, just as
its power to act outside its limits (except in the field of utilities) must rest on statutory
authorization. See Fordham and Asher, "Home Rule Power," 9 Ohio St. L.J. 18, 33
(1948). Thus, Ohio municipalities hold a dual position and derive power from two
sources, the constitution and statutes. The "gimmick" is in the application. Many, if
not most, matters are of some interest to both state and local government. Unless
carefully refined distinctions are made, the label of "state-wide concern" can effectively
throw municipal action right back into the common law concept and Judge Dillon's
thesis.
Gamble even states that the General Assembly can impose duties on municipalities
to act as arms or agencies of the State. However, in State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips,
168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1948) the court specifically questioned that proposi-
tion. It would seem especially doubtful if the State attempted to foist upon a munici-
pality the financial cost of supporting a state agency which is established within its
limits.
64 A broad definition of "police regulations" was another device to avoid the
Fitzgerald doctrine. For example, in State ex rel. O'Driscoll v. Cull, 138 Ohio St. 516,
37 N.E.2d 49 (1941), the court held a civil service education requirement to be a
"police" regulation, and void for "conflict" with state law. The case was overruled by
State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1948). The furthest
reach was probably attained in Hagerman v. Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 246
(1947), which stated that a provision for voluntary check-off of union dues was a
"police" regulation in "conflict" with general laws. However, the broad statements in
Hagerman are clearly dictum. See the excellent review of the definition of "police"
power in 20 Ohio St. L.J. 152 (1959).
65 The development of the "conflict" concept is a very complex subject. The two
major trouble areas are statutory interpretation, and the question of prohibitions. With
respect to interpretation, if the court does not require specific, affirmative state action
and goes beyond the explicit provisions, or necessary implications of a statute, local
action will frequently be in "conflict." Suppose a statute making it unlawful to exceed
25 MPH, and an ordinance setting it at 15 MPH. It is reasonable to imply that the
statute permits speeds less than 25 MPH. However, in the absence of any statute it
would also be lawful to go less than 25 MPH. Therefore it is not a necessary implica-
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Non-charter municipal power, and the other three areas just
mentioned, have a close causal relationship to each other. The Con-
stitutional Convention of 1912 did not itself provide a solution to the
basic problem of delineating the power of the General Assembly and
those of the municipalities. By using the almost meaningless phrase
"local self-government," 6 that deeply political question was thrown
to the supreme court. Nor did the Convention adequately answer the
question of who was to assume responsibility for imposing controls on
the exercise of power by local officials. We have learned, as we should
have expected, that the mantle of the judiciary does not make political
questions any less controversial or any less difficult of solution.
Yet, even though controversial and difficult, why is it that stare
decisis did not provide us with at least certainty in results?
The allure of absolute local autonomy seems to have faded with
the fading memory of pre-1912 conditions. It almost faded from sight
in the 1940's in that series of cases found in volume 138 of the Ohio
State Reports. It would seem more than coincidence that the tide of
local autonomy ran strongly from 1913 to the middle 1930's; that
the shift toward state power reached its high point in decisions of the
middle 1940's; and that the movement toward a middle road began
in the late 1940's and continued through the 1950's. It takes no
historian or sociologist to identify an initial concern with legislative
irresponsibility, the depression and war era, and the rise of new
municipal problems in the post-war period.
But to explain these major shifts in judicial attitude, it is not
necessary to develop a thesis on how courts "follow the election
returns." The Fitzgerald doctrine itself could account for the obvious
lack of consistency in the court's underlying attitude toward home-
rule. That doctrine placed the court in a particularly awkward
position.
First, by using the broad phrase "local self-government," the
tion from the negative statute that lesser speeds were permitted. It can not be said
that the statute, as opposed to common law, permits a lesser speed. Thus the ordinance,
which can change common law, should not be held in "conflict." However, compare
Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929).
Mere prohibitions are, as such, considered ineffective to create a conflict. See for
example City of Fremont v. Keating, 961 Ohio St. 468, 118 N.E. 114 (1917). But
prohibitions have been used in interpreting statutes to draw broad implications of
legislative intent. Again compare Schneidernan. A more sophisticated form of prohibi-
tion arises if the court adopts a "pre-emption" theory. Hints of such an approach can
be found. See Stary v. Brooklin, 162 Ohio St. 120, 121 N.E.2d 11 (1954). An excellent
example of full blown "pre-emption" is Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d
482 (1942).
66 This phrase was hopefully substituted for the California constitution phrase
"municipal affairs."
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Convention foisted upon the court the primary responsibility of deter-
mining the division of governmental power. In adopting the Fitzgerald
doctrine, the court* assumed the sole responsibility of dealing with a
substantial and important segment of that problem. It could not let
the correction of any "mistakes" fall on legislative action. When a
matter is declared to be a home-rule, non-police power, it is constitu-
tionally placed beyond the general grant of legislative power to the
General Assembly. A depression, a war era, and a post-war expansion
bring changes in beliefs on what is desirable, even necessary, areas for
state action. It is perhaps natural then to find the court, on the one
hand, being chary of what is included in "local self-government" and,
on the other hand, being astute in developing concepts which avoid or
narrow the impact of the doctrine.
Second, the doctrine accentuated the problem of providing accept-
able controls over the actions of local officials. In matters of structure
of government, police regulations, taxation, debt, and now perhaps
civil service, the local officials are subject to either state statutes or
local control imposed by the adoption of a charter. However, Fitz-
gerald and Perrysburg, taken together, meant that in the general area
of "local self-government," the officials of more than 90% of our
municipalities would not be subject to either of those controls. 7
True, these officials would have no greater power within that
area than the General Assembly formerly had, and still has within the
present scope of article II. True, the municipal electorate could
readily impose a charter. But the parentalistic common-law concept
of statutory control is deeply imbedded in the legal mind. Had a case
directly presented the problem in the 1920's, it seems apparent that
those arguments would have prevailed. However, except in Hugger,
the full implications of the doctrines did not reach the supreme court
until Morris in 1954, and Petit in 1960. By then the court apparently
was no longer prepared to accept the concept of "full home-rule
powerly in non-charter municipalities.
Article XVIII has provided considerable local autonomy, espe-
cially for charter municipalities. The only glaringly bad spot is in
taxation, debt and fiscal controls generally. It seems probable, how-
ever, that the entire operation of the article will one day be drastically
revised in a belated rush to solve metropolitan problems. Our experi-
ence can, and should, provide us with the basis to do a better job.
67 In June 1960, only 90 of 926 municipalities had adopted charters.
